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Abstract: Contrary to the received view, I argue that Kant, in the “Doctrine of Right”, out-
lines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and voluntarist conceptions of political
legitimacy. According to this republican alternative, a state must meet certain institutional
requirements before political obligations arise. An important result of this interpretation
is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state’s use of coercion, but
also that the rights of the state (‘public right’) are not in principle reducible to the rights of
individuals (‘private right’). Thus, for Kant, political obligations are intimately linked to the
existence of a certain kind of republican institutional framework.
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Introduction1
One of the great appeals of voluntarism is that it presents itself as the only pos-
sible alternative to an absolutist conception of political legitimacy, according to
which might makes right. Many of Kant’s interpreters have accepted this dichot-
omy, and as a consequence argue that a fundamental problem with Kant’s non-
consensual theory of political obligations is its complementary absolutist concep-
tion of political legitimacy.2 Indeed, this interpretation appears affirmed by Kant
himself, since many of his formulations invite the absolutist interpretation. Never-
1 I am grateful to Rachel Bryant, Katrin Flikschuh, Beatrix Himmelmann, Pauline Klein-
geld, Arnt Myrstad, Arthur Ripstein, Sergio Tenenbaum and Shelley Weinberg. Thanks
also to: the audience and my commentator Zach Hoskins at the 2007 Illinois Philosophi-
cal Association Conference at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Nov. 9–10;
the audience and my commentator Kyla Ebels-Duggan at the 2008 APA Central Division
meeting, Chicago, April 17–19, 2008; the Pacific Study Group of the North American
Kant Society 2006 Meeting, October 21–22, 2006, University of California-Riverside,
Riverside, California.
2 For example, see Sarah Williams Holtman: “Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian
Citizenship”, 212–213 and 224–227. In: Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mark
Timmons. New York 2002, 209–232; Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant. Translated by Mar-
shall Farrier. Albany 1994, 186f; Wolfgang Kersting: “Kant’s Concept of the State”, 162f.
In: Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Edited by Howard L. Williams. Chicago 1992,
143–166, but note that Kersting appears to hold a different view in “Politics, freedom,
and order: Kant’s Political Philosophy”, on 361. In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant.
Edited by Paul Guyer. New York 1992, 342–366; Allen D. Rosen: Kant’s Theory of Jus-
tice. New York 1993, 141–148; Howard L. Williams: Kant’s Political Philosophy. New
York 1983, 198–208.
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theless, I believe that this is a mistaken interpretation. It results from an incorrect
reading of Kant’s political writings, of which the “Doctrine of Right” in the Meta-
physics of Morals is the most important. The mistake has been to read Kant’s texts
through what I will call ‘voluntarist lenses’. When contemporary Kantians ana-
lyze Kant’s political texts through voluntarist lenses they wrongly assume both
that Kant’s circumstances of justice are the same as those proposed by Hume and
Locke, and that the ideal of political legitimacy must be either absolutist or vol-
untarist.
There are several reasons to draw this conclusion. First, the majority of contem-
porary, historical interpretations of Kant mistakenly maintain that he considers
the state merely prudentially necessary to overcome problems arising from im-
moral behaviour (humanity’s ‘warped wood’) as well as from a general lack of re-
sources. On this view, the state is not in principle necessary to enable justice3,
but is simply a palliative or remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature.
Moreover, these historical interpretations presume that Kant accepted the dichot-
omy between voluntarism and absolutism. And since anyone with half a brain rec-
ognizes the irrationality of staying in the state of nature, they assume that Kant
sided with Hobbes.4 In this way, they argue that considerations of prudence and
simple assurance of property right lead Kant to the conclusion that our political
obligations must be understood in non-consensual terms. And any sovereign that
manages to subject the people to its rule is a legitimate political power, to which
the people are politically obligated. Hence, they see Kant as affirming an absolut-
ist conception of political legitimacy.
Second, when contemporary Kantian theorists, such as Onora O’Neill5 and the
early John Rawls6, develop their own Kantian positions they typically argue that
Kant should have opted for a weak version of voluntarism.7 An absolutist concep-
tion of political legitimacy makes right into might and, therefore, is totally unac-
ceptable. Instead, Kant should have argued that individuals’ rights set the bound-
aries for rightful uses of state coercion, and these individual rights should have
3 I use ‘justice’ and ‘right’ interchangeably throughout this paper.
4 For prudential readings of Kant’s and the Kantian argument, see Mary J. Gregor: Laws of
Freedom. Oxford 1963; Jeffrie G. Murphy: Kant: The Philosophy of Right, Macon 1994,
34, 70, 75f., 104, 107; John Rawls: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge 1999, 110, though
see also Political Liberalism. New York 1996, 66; Thomas Pogge: “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a
‘Comprehensive Liberalism?’”. In: Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, 147; Onora O’Neill:
Bounds of Justice. Cambridge 2000, 139; Kenneth Westphal: “A Kantian Justification of
Possession. In: Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals”, 108, but contrast with 91, 104, 109; and
Howard L. Williams: Kant’s Political Philosophy. 10f., 70, 73, 164, 169f., 185.
5 Onora O’Neill: Bounds of Justice; Constructions of Justice. Cambridge 1989; and To-
wards Justice and Virtue – A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge
1996.
6 John Rawls: A Theory of Justice.
7 Some interpreters argue that Kant actually defends weak voluntarism. For example, see
Alexander Kaufman: Welfare in the Kantian State. New York 1999; Paul Guyer: Kant on
Freedom, Law, and Happiness. New York 2000, and Kant. New York 2006; and Patrick
Riley: Will and Political Legitimacy. A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. Cambridge 1999.
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included a right to cover certain basic needs. Though these contemporary Kan-
tians do not follow Locke in arguing for actual consent as a precondition on
political obligations (strong voluntarism), they do argue for a weak version of vol-
untarism. Rightful coercion and legitimate political authority are understood in
terms of hypothetical consent to principles of justice that are responsive to con-
siderations of need.
In this paper, I argue that Kant’s non-voluntarist conception of political obli-
gations is not complemented by an absolutist conception of political legitimacy.
I argue that Kant outlines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and volun-
tarist conceptions of political legitimacy. According to this republican alternative,
a state must meet certain institutional requirements before political obligations
arise or before persons subject to its power are obligated to recognize its rightful
authority over them. Kant argues that the state must represent the general, united
will by representing the will of each person born within its jurisdiction. This is
achieved by setting itself up as a public authority that posits and enforces laws in
a way reconcilable with each subject’s right to freedom, namely by ensuring that
the totality of laws (public right) secures institutional conditions in which individ-
uals can exercise their external freedom, or choice in space and time, rightfully.
So, rather than understanding political legitimacy in terms of either absolutism or
voluntarism, Kant argues that it is intimately linked to the existence of a certain,
republican institutional framework.
An important result of understanding Kant to be putting forward a third repub-
lican alternative to absolutism or voluntarism, and thus showing the dichotomy to
be false, is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state’s use
of coercion, but also that the rights of the state are not seen as reducible to the
rights of individuals. When Kant’s texts are read through voluntarist lenses these
aspects of Kant’s theory do not become apparent, which is the reason why many
contemporary Kantian theorists have been unable to capture these highly import-
ant features of Kant’s theory of the legitimate state. And as will become clear,
reading Kant through voluntarist lenses is the reason why Kant often is seen, al-
beit mistakenly, to have little to say about issues of economic justice. The volun-
tarist lenses make it impossible to see the way in which Kant links the state’s legit-
imacy to the existence of public institutions that secure conditions of economic
justice.
1. Kant’s Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations
In the private right sections of the “Doctrine of Right” Kant argues that justice
is possible only within civil society, or within a liberal, legal framework. Civil
society is an enforceable precondition of justice and not merely a remedy for the
inconveniences characterizing the state of nature, understood as a condition with-
out a public authority (MS, AA 06: 307–308, cf. TP, AA 08: 294–295, 313, ZeF,
AA 08: 354). These conclusions are grounded in Kant’s relational understanding
of right, according to which individuals’ interactions must be respectful of each
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other’s innate right to “freedom”, understood as her right to “independence from
being constrained by another’s choice […] insofar as it can coexist with the free-
dom of every other in accordance with a universal law.”8 Interaction consistent
with each person’s innate right to freedom is deemed impossible in the state of
nature. Right cannot be realized privately by each individual acting virtuously be-
cause it is impossible for private individuals to provide rightful assurance and
to overcome certain problems of indeterminacy characterising the specification of
the private right principles of private property, contract and status relations in the
state of nature. So there are two insoluble problems in the state of nature: the
problem of rightful assurance and the problem of indeterminacy regarding appli-
cation. In short, private property, contract, and status relations9 among individ-
uals cannot be both rightful, or respectful of each individual’s innate right to free-
dom, and at the same time determined and assured by a private authority. And
private authority is the only authority there is in the state of nature. Indeed, even
mutual agreement cannot make relations among individuals rightful in the state
of nature, since in this situation everyone’s external freedom is still subject to one
another’s arbitrary choice.
Due to the problems of assurance and indeterminacy, Kant maintains individ-
uals can enjoy only provisional rights in this condition and that staying in the
state of nature is to commit wrongdoing. It is to stay in a condition where we sub-
ject one another’s external freedom to one another’s arbitrary choices rather than
to universal law, and so rightful external freedom is impossible in the state of na-
ture. At best, the state of nature is “a state devoid of justice” [ein Zustand der
Rechtlosigkeit (MS, AA 06: 312.24)], meaning that in the best case scenario it is
a condition in which particular individuals do not wrong one another, but yet in
choosing to remain in the state of nature they renounce any concept of right. Con-
sequently, writes Kant, men “in general […] do wrong in the highest degree by
willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful”.10 That is, individ-
uals choosing to stay in the state of nature do wrong in the highest degree even if
the wrong they do is not done against particular individuals. In order to interact
rightfully with others they must therefore establish a condition in which their in-
teractions are subject to universal laws rather than to one another’s arbitrary re-
strictions. And the only way to do this is by establishing a will that represents the
will of each and yet the will of no one particular private individual. That is to say,
8 I have used Mary Gregor’s translation of Kant’s works in Immanuel Kant: Practical Phil-
osophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996. MS, AA 06: 237.29–31: “Freiheit (Unabhän-
gigkeit von eines Anderen nöthigender Willkür), sofern sie mit jedes Anderen Freiheit
nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen kann”.
9 Status relations include all relations, in which one person has legal standing with regard
to another person’s private life. I discuss these relations in more detail in “Kant’s Non-
Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of
Nature”. In: Kantian Review 13: 2, 2008, 1–45, and in “A Kantian Conception of Right-
ful Sexual Relations: Sex, (Gay) Marriage and Prostitution”. In: Social Philosophy Today
22, 2007, 199–218.
10 MS, AA 06: 307.31–32–308.01: […] überhaupt tun sie im höchsten Grade daran unrecht,
in einem Zustande sein und bleiben zu wollen, der kein rechtlicher ist.”
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rightful interaction requires the establishment of a will or authority that is impar-
tial in its form or a public, general will or a public authority.11 To refuse to enter
civil society is therefore to refuse the condition under which interaction respectful
of each person’s innate right to freedom is possible. This is why refusing to enter
civil society is to commit wrongdoing in the highest degree, and individuals have a
strict or enforceable duty to set up a public authority to provide assurance and
to specify the rules for their interaction.12 Moreover, because consent cannot be a
necessary condition for the establishment of a rightful state, Kant concludes that
the liberal ideal of political obligations is non-voluntarist in nature.13 Let us now
consider why this does not entail an absolutist conception of political legitimacy.
To see this we must consider Kant’s account of public right.
2. Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of State Legitimacy
“Public right”, Kant argues, is the “sum of the laws which need to be promul-
gated generally in order to bring about a rightful condition”.14 Elsewhere he ex-
plains, “the only constitution that accords with right” is a “pure republic”. The
pure republican constitution accords with right because it “makes freedom the
principle and indeed the condition for any exercise of coercion”.15 In yet another
place, Kant explains that public right ultimately aims to enable a condition in
which each citizen’s freedom, equality and independence is secured.16 What does
this mean? It can only be that constitutive of public right is the establishment of
a public monopoly on coercion to overcome the problem of assurance and the
public positing and application of those laws whose function it is to overcome
the problem of indeterminacy regarding the specification of the private right prin-
ciples (private property, contract and status relations). Thus, we need an account
of how the sovereign sets itself up as a public authority to overcome the problems
11 See MS, AA 06: 345–346; AA 08: 344, 351–352.
12 See TP, AA 08: 371; MS, AA 06: 230, 232.
13 See my “Kant’s Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations” for the full argu-
ment why justice is impossible in the state of nature. The paper at hand can be seen as a
sequel of sorts to “Kant’s Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations”. It con-
cerns national public right in the “Doctrine of Right”, and hence takes off from the inter-
pretation that Kant defends a non-voluntarist conception of political obligations in the
private right section of the “Doctrine of Right”. In: “Diversity and Unity. An Attempt at
Drawing a Justifiable Line”. In: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie/Archives for
Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (ARSP) 94, 2008, Heft 1: 1–25, I discuss the
other two forms of public right in the “Doctrine of Right”, namely the right of nations
and cosmopolitan right.
14 MS, AA 06: 311.06–08: Der Inbegriff der Gesetze, die einer allgemeinen Bekanntmachung
bedürfen, um einen rechtlichen Zustand hervorzubringen, ist das öffentliche[.] Recht.”
15 Die “einzig rechtmäßige Verfassung” ist die “einer reinen Republik” (MS, AA: 06:
340.31–32). Sie allein “[macht] die Freiheit zum Princip, ja zur Bedingung alles Zwan-
ges […], der zu einer rechtlichen Verfassung im eigentlichen Sinne des Staats erforderlich
ist […]” (MS, AA 06: 340.35–37).
16 See MS, AA 06: 314; TP, AA 08: 290.
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of assurance and indeterminacy in the right way. As we shall see, Kant ultimately
argues that a tripartite authority that secures the rights of each citizen is required.
But Kant, in contrast to Locke, does not limit public right to private right, or to
laws that in principle are reducible to the provisional rights held by individuals
in the state of nature. Instead, I suggest, Kant argues that public right must make
‘freedom its principle’ by addressing also the additional challenges resulting from
the fact that the public authority must establish a monopoly on coercion. When
the public authority establishes a monopoly on coercion, it creates what Kant
in the essay “Perpetual Peace” calls a dependency relation between itself and its
citizens that it must make rightful.17 The state must reconcile its sole right to use
coercion with each individual’s innate right to freedom by ensuring that the total
system of law provides conditions under which each private person’s freedom is
subject to universal law. The state therefore does not merely posit laws regard-
ing private right. It must also secure each citizen’s ‘freedom, equality and indepen-
dence’ through additional institutional provisions for its citizens – through public
right. This is why, on Kant’s view, the state has a right to do things that private
individuals in the state of nature cannot be seen as having a provisional right to
do, or why the rights of the state (the principles of public right) do not in principle
reduce to the rights of individuals (the principles of private right). Moreover, what
makes the public right argument an a priori argument is that it follows from
requirements internal to rightful external freedom (‘right’) once the monopoly on
coercion by the state is assumed.18 Finally, Kant argues that in order for the public
institutional system to be legitimate, its actual establishment must be a ‘pure
republic’, meaning that it must be representational in nature. It is because the
legitimacy of the state is tied to the establishment of the public institutional frame-
work that Kant’s position is non-voluntarist, yet non-absolutist and republican in
nature. For considerations of space, I will focus only on how the public authority
must fulfill three institutional requirements regarding its structure (tripartite
public authority, equal systemic freedom, and unconditional poverty relief) and
must be representative in nature before there is civil society with its corresponding
political obligations.19 First I consider why the public authority must be a tripar-
17 See ZeF, AA 08: 349–350; 349n; cf. MS, AA 06: 316.
18 See MS, AA 06: 313.
19 Kant argues that in addition to positing laws governing private property, contract and
status relations, civil society must have the following institutional composition: 1.) a tri-
partite (legislative, executive and judiciary) public authority; 2.) public institutions gov-
erning land, the economy, finances and the police; 3.) public institutions that provide un-
conditional poverty relief; 4.) public offices to administer the state, and finally, 5.) a
public system of punishment for both private and public crimes. In Kant’s text, the last
four of these institutions are given the sub-headings B, C, D and E under the overall head-
ing: “General Remark On the Effects with Regard to Rights that Follow from the Nature
of the Civil Union [Allgemeine Anmerkung von den rechtlichen Wirkungen aus der Natur
des bürgerlichen Vereins]” (MS, AA 06: 318.15–17). The tripartite structure of the sov-
ereign is discussed in § 47–49 immediately before section A, which discusses the right to
revolution. I combine the discussion of the tripartite nature of the state and the right to
revolution in section 2.1 below. Due to considerations of space, I do not deal with point 4
(D) and 5 (E) in this paper.
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tite public authority in order to represent the general, united will and so to pro-
vide rightful solutions to the problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding
the specification of private right (section 2.1.). Subsequently, in sections 2.2 and
2.3, I address the requirements concerning equal systemic freedom and uncondi-
tional poverty relief, before in section 2.4 addressing the representative nature of
the ‘pure’ republic.
2.1 The Tripartite Public Authority and Revolution
Kant’s theory of public right is constructed on the basis of his conception of
rightful external freedom, which is grounded on each person’s innate right to free-
dom. To have one’s external freedom subject to universal law is to be restricted
symmetrically and in a non-contingent manner. Kant’s conception of rightful ex-
ternal freedom (‘right’) explains both why the public authority must establish a
monopoly on uses of coercion and why although revolution is impermissible, one
is obligated to respect the new sovereign after a successful revolution.
The function of the civil authority is to subject and assure each subject’s exter-
nal freedom under universal law, or rightful external freedom. In the brief sum-
mary of Kant’s conception of private right above, we saw both that any privately
provided solutions to the problems of indeterminacy and assurance cannot enable
such rightful external freedom. Therefore, the civil authority must assume a mon-
opoly on coercion, since this is necessary to enable rightful external freedom.
What is more, as Kant argues in public right section A, it follows from this that
there can be no individual right to revolution or individual resistance to govern-
mental authority, since such uses of coercion not only undermine the possibility
of rightful assurance, but are also unilateral. After all, the reason why we have a
strict duty to leave the state of nature is that we have an obligation to leave behind
a condition in which our external freedom is constantly and necessarily subject
to other person’s arbitrary uses of coercion. To put the point differently, to have a
right to revolution presupposes that rightful relations are possible in the state of
nature, and yet Kant takes himself to have shown in the private right sections that
this is impossible. Consequently, revolution and coercive resistance to the sover-
eign always amount to wrongdoing.20 For the same reason, however, if a success-
ful revolution actually has taken place and a new sovereign with a just institu-
tional framework has been established, then the people are politically obliged to
obey the new sovereign.21
How, then, to conceive of the public authority, or a political authority with
an impartial form? The first requirement is that the authority must represent the
“general united will of the people.22 This is achieved by establishing the three ar-
20 See MS, AA 06: 318ff.
21 See MS, AA 06: 323.
22 MS, AA 06: 314: “der allgemein vereinigte Volkswille”.
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tificial public authorities, or ‘thought entities’23, constitutive of a public will: a
legislator, an executrix and a judge.24 Moreover, because the indeterminacy prob-
lem makes it impossible to be independent from others’ arbitrary choices and sub-
ject to universal law in the state of nature, when instituting the public authority
the challenge is to avoid reproducing this problem. In order to do this, the public
authority must constitute itself as the rule of public law. First, this does not only
mean that the political and legal authority must treat each of its subjects as equals
under the law,25 but also that the legislator must be seen as having primacy with
regard to the other two sovereign authorities. The legislative authority is prior to
the others in that posited law must delineate the powers of the other two authori-
ties. Only if posited law is constitutive of the executive and judiciary authorities
can they enable interaction under universal law rather than subjection to arbitrary
choices. This is why Kant says that in an important sense the legislator is the sov-
ereign. The sovereign authority is primarily invested in the legislator by its au-
thority to posit laws, whereas the executive authority enforces the law posited by
the legislator, and the judicial authority adjudicates actual conflicts amongst the
subjects by the relevant posited laws.26 Kant illustrates this by saying that the legis-
lator can be seen as the major premise in a practical syllogism, the executive
authority’s resulting command is the minor premise and the judge’s verdict is the
conclusion.27 Nevertheless, despite the primacy of the legislator, the three consti-
tuents of the public authority complement each other and are simultaneously sub-
ordinated to each other without also usurping each other’s functions. They must
therefore be seen as comprising three different, yet complementary principles,
which ensure the rule of universal law and so are established as authoritative
rather than merely powerful.28
Second, the legislative, the executive and judiciary authorities cannot be the ar-
bitrary choices of a private person, but must be non-contingent and symmetrical
restrictions. How is this done? Consider the case in which the three artificial
authorities constitutive of a public authority are represented by a monarch. The
requirement of non-contingency is met by the monarch being a public person and
not a private individual, namely by the monarch not having private property. This
is why Kant says that the sovereign “possesses nothing (of his own) except him-
self; for if he had something of his own alongside others in the state, a dispute
could arise between them and there would be no judge to settle it. But one can
also say that he possesses everything, since he had the right to command over the
people, to whom all external things belong […] the right to assign to each what
23 MS, AA 06: 338.
24 See MS, AA 06: 313; cf. ZeF, AA 08: 352; cf. 350–351.
25 For example, when Jews no longer could own private property in Nazi-Germany, Nazi-
Germany seized to be a legitimate state. – Cf. MS, AA 06: 314; TP, AA 294–295.
26 Matters of guilt or innocence, Kant argues are determined by the people (as members of a
jury). In this way, if the jury is mistaken, then the people have wrongly judged themselves
(MS, AA 06: 317–318).
27 See MS, AA 06: 313.
28 See MS, AA 06: 316–18.
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is his”.29 The monarch cannot own private property and the property over which it
exerts any kind of authority belongs to the people (public property) and is governed
by posited law. Instead, the monarch determines and secures its citizens’ rights
against one another. The first step to secure that the monarch is impartial in its form
therefore yields the requirement that the monarch cannot have private property,
since this would make it impossible for it to issue non-contingent restrictions.
In turn, symmetry is secured by the same actions of all private persons being
subjected to the same restrictions. With respect to its function as a legislator, this
means that the monarch’s law must be posited law. It cannot consist in daily de-
crees by the monarch. The main problem with having a system of daily decrees
is not that it makes it almost impossible to know what the law is, but that the
subjects would then be subject to the arbitrary choices of the monarch and would
not be reciprocally restricted in their use of freedom vis-à-vis each other. More-
over, as mentioned above, posited law must constitute the two other offices of the
monarch. Therefore the monarch, as judge, must not only adjudicate all disputes
in accordance with its posited law, but his actions as judge are themselves spec-
ified by posited law. The monarch does not subject persons to symmetrical restric-
tions if its adjudications are simply his changing opinions rather than determi-
nations in accordance with the rule of law. Finally, symmetry is enabled by how
the office of the executrix is governed by posited law and by the executrix enforc-
ing only the judgements of the judiciary against private individuals.
In sum, the crux of the first condition set by public right is that each branch of
the tripartite authority must institutionalize the non-contingency and symmetry
that rightful external freedom demands. This is achieved through the requirement
that the sovereign’s exercise of its authority is detached from private interests and
arbitrary choices, and instead is constituted by the rule of public law. By being so
constructed, the sovereign is impartial in its form. Moreover, the two conditions
of non-contingency and symmetry are conceptually connected. It is because the
sovereign does not have private (contingent) interests that it can subject all the
citizens (private persons) to symmetrical restrictions. And it is because the sover-
eign’s tripartite authority is a thoroughgoing system of public law that it enables
interaction under universal law rather than subjection to any particular person’s
arbitrary choice.
2.2 Equal Systemic Freedom
The second and third condition on legitimate public authority, which I will
call the conditions of ‘equal systemic freedom’ and ‘unconditional poverty relief’,
each concern additional institutional systemic requirements constitutive of public
29 “Von einem Landesherrn kann man sagen: er besitzt nichts (zu eigen), außer sich selbst;
denn wenn er neben einem anderen im Staat etwas zu eigen hätte, so würde mit diesem ein
Streit möglich sein, zu dessen Schlichtung kein Richter wäre. Aber man kann auch sagen:
er besitzt alles; weil er das Befehlshaberrecht über das Volk hat (jedem das Seine zu Theil
kommen zu lassen), dem alle äußere Sachen […] zugehören.”] (MS, AA 06: 324.14–20).
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right. Each requirement stems from how the public authority must first assume a
monopoly on coercion and then must ensure that this monopoly is reconcilable
with each subject’s innate right to freedom.
The second condition on legitimate public authority requires the state to as-
sume the role of guarantor of rightful relations with regard to land, the economy
and finances. It does this by securing conditions of equal systemic freedom for
its citizens. A condition of equal systemic freedom exists when the institutional
framework, within which individuals use their rightful means to set and pursue
ends, is itself constituted by universal (non-contingent, symmetrical) restrictions.
If the institutional framework itself is subject to some private person’s arbitrary
choices, then it cannot provide a condition in which all persons’ external freedom
is non-contingently and symmetrically restricted, including when they set and
pursue ends with their means. Hence, the state must ensure that property deter-
mining systems function according to universal laws. The state must provide in-
stitutional guarantees that the systems within which private persons’ means have
value and within which they set and pursue ends are not themselves subjected to
the arbitrary choices of private individuals. Rather, there must be a public frame-
work within which persons exercise external freedom independently and as
equals. Only in this way can the state ensure that no one private person finds her-
self in a condition where the use of her external freedom is subjected to the arbit-
rary choice of other private persons rather than to universal law.
With regard to land, Kant argues that providing a guarantee of equal systemic
freedom involves implementing two kinds of institutional requirements. First,
the state issues and repeals statutes governing ‘artificial’ landowners, such as cor-
porations and clerical orders.30 For example, it is inconsistent with conditions of
equal systemic freedom that artificial persons own land in perpetuity. The reason
is that though persons as part of exercising their external freedom can establish
such artificial persons, these artificial persons can continue to exist only insofar as
there also exist persons who are exercising their private property rights through
them. Because the state must make sure that the land belongs only to the people,
corporations and clerical orders cannot have rights that exceed the rights of the
individuals who exercise their rights through them at any time. Therefore, the
state as guarantor of equal systemic freedom cannot recognise such artificial per-
sons to exist in perpetuity, but rather must issue and repeal statutes restricting
these artificial persons as appropriate.
Second, Kant argues that the state generates conditions of equal systemic free-
dom by taxing private landowners insofar as necessary to secure rightful inter-
action on the land.31 External freedom is to use one’s means to set and pursue
ends in space and time, either alone or together with others subject to universal
law. Since it is impossible for us, as embodied beings, to exist and do anything,
that is, to be somewhere, to physically move, to acquire and trade things etc. with-
out access to land, it follows that external freedom requires access to land. More-
30 See MS, AA 06: 324–325.
31 See MS, AA 06: 325.
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over, since the sovereign is the means through which a particular person’s exclu-
sive possession of land can be made rightful, the rightfulness of any particular
claim to land derives from the state’s affirmation of it.32 How, then, does the
sovereign go about evaluating whether the provisionally rightful claims to land
should be affirmed as rightful (‘concluded’)? There seem to be two considerations
here. First, if any access to land is determined by some particular (group of) pri-
vate persons, such as private landowners, then others (the landless persons) find
their external freedom subjected to these private persons’ (the landowners’) arbi-
trary choices. Second, since it is possible for the citizens to set ends together only
if they can actually reach one another, the state must make it possible for each
citizen legally to reach any other citizen via land.33 To reconcile the landowners’
exclusive possession of land with everyone’s innate right to freedom, the state as
‘supreme proprietor’ of the land must therefore provide institutional guarantees
that everyone has sufficient access to land – a place physically to exist and a legal
means of physically reaching one another. The main point is that if any particu-
lar citizen is without legal access to any land or can physically reach someone else
only given a third person’s consent, then the state has failed to ensure that the
landowners have rightful possession of their land since their exclusive landowner-
ship is irreconcilable with each citizen’s innate right to freedom.
It is for these reasons that Kant maintains that the principle governing the sys-
tem of law cannot simply be a principle of “aggregation” [Aggregation]34, under-
stood as a principle according to which the determination of who owns what is
simply an aggregate of individual provisionally rightful property claims in the
state of nature. Instead, in order to reconcile its monopoly with each person’s
right to freedom the state must employ a principle of “division” [Einteilung]35 to
regulate the private property institution. By this Kant means that the state must
ensure that the totality of law is such that each citizen is secured equal systemic
freedom under the law with regard to land. Thus, insofar as necessary the state
must tax landowners and use the revenue to buy land as required to make the re-
lation between landowners and non-landowners rightful, such as by building pub-
lic roads and providing housing opportunities. In this way state taxation on land
secures equal systemic freedom, namely by making it possible for people to exist
and to use their means to set and pursue ends on the land without this possibility
being under the control of someone else’s arbitrary choice. If the state does not do
this, then it fails to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with the rights of each of
citizen.
Although the state must have the right to tax landowners insofar as necessary to
ensure that the system as a whole provides conditions of equal systemic freedom
for all, it can neither be that each person is guaranteed a particular kind of physi-
cal transportation system nor the opportunity to buy a particular or equal amount
32 See MS, AA 06: 323.
33 For an excellent exposition of this point, see Arthur Ripstein’s “Roads to Freedom”. In:
Force and Freedom. Harvard University Press 2009.
34 MS, AA 06: 323.35.
35 Ibid.
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of land. Rather, persons are guaranteed that they have access to land and that they
can access one another’s land if they want to set ends together. Hence, the exact
type, portion, etc. of land the state must purchase with tax revenues or the exact
purposes towards which the land should be put in order to reconcile the relation
between landowners and the landless and travellers cannot be determined in ad-
vance (a priori). For example, though all states must make it possible for everyone
to move across land for purposes of interaction, their methods for doing so may
be different. For some it might be necessary only to posit laws to regulate people’s
movement across each other’s land; in other cases it might be necessary to pur-
chase land to enable an effective infrastructure (roads and utilities). Similar rea-
soning applies to cases of buying up land to facilitate private housing. The point
is that only the public authority is authorised to make these kinds of judgements,
and their content depends upon which type of society (rural, technological, trade
based etc.) exists. Although prior determinations of the use of tax revenues are
impossible due to their context-dependency, it is clear that the state has a right
and duty to tax landowners in order to provide conditions of equal systemic free-
dom with regard to land. So, if a particular political authority takes no reasonable
steps to make landownership rightful by securing conditions of equal systemic
freedom through land taxation, then it is not exercising its coercive powers legit-
imately, and political obligations do not exist.
The reasoning is similar with regard to the regulation and administration of the
economy, as Kant here also defends a public systemic solution to what he con-
siders a systemic problem. The public authority as guarantor of the economy must
act as ‘supreme commander’ of the economic system, which consists in relations
of exchange between private persons. Regardless of what type of economic system
the state permits, it must assume a special authoritative role with regard to the
way in which means are exchanged by ensuring that it secures what we might call
a ‘public marketplace’. The state fulfils this role by positing and enforcing laws
that secure each person’s right to access and participate in the public marketplace
on equal terms. In particular, it posits laws to regulate the ways in which people
participate as buyers and sellers in the marketplace. Having the right to access the
public marketplace to exchange one’s means preserves the right to freedom in a
marketbased system where people are dependent upon trade to set and pursue
ends. Therefore, the state must ensure that the economic system does not in prin-
ciple deny access to persons with relevant means or deny them access to trade on
equal terms. Since the citizens’ exercise of external choice is dependent on the
economic system, the state must regulate actual economic practices to ensure
equal systemic freedom. Distinctions between permissible and impermissible ways
in which to engage in economic activity (trade) will be drawn precisely at the li-
mits at which equal systemic freedom is threatened.
For example, the state can prohibit the creation of monopolies on trade in a
capitalist system. The power enjoyed by a monopoly enables it, in principle, to
prohibit others from pursuing ends through the marketplace since the monopoly
is in sole control of the supply. Moreover, a capitalist market system requires com-
petition in order for markets to function, and there is no competition when mon-
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opolies exist. Another example could be the public requirement upon businesses
to provide access for physically impaired persons to enter their stores. If the public
marketplace is inaccessible to those with physical impairments, and, as everyone
else, the state has tied their exercise of external freedom to trade, then the state
must institute regulations ensuring conditions of equal systemic freedom. Only by
ensuring that a person’s access is subject only to symmetrical and non-contingent
restrictions through regulated participation, can the public authority provide the
conditions of equal systemic freedom for all with regard to the economic system.
In this way, public institutional regulations on trade preserve the individual’s in-
nate right to have her external freedom subject only to universal law and not to
the arbitrary choices of others.
The same assumption of special responsibility by the public authority must ac-
company its introduction of a financial system. For example, the state guarantees
conditions of equal systemic freedom with respect to permitting the introduction
of money by assuming responsibility for regulating the monetary (financial) sys-
tem. External freedom is the ability to set and pursue ends subject to universal law
and hence a person’s means constitutes her external freedom. Once the value of a
person’s means is determined by a monetary system, there must be public systemic
regulation of the value of money. The state must ensure that the value of a per-
son’s means is not arbitrarily determined by some other private person, but only
by public law. Only in this way can it ensure that permitting a financial system is
consistent with each individual’s innate right to freedom. The complexity of the
financial system will, of course, determine the complexity of regulations required
to ensure that the system does its job. But the crucial test that the state provides its
subjects with conditions under which they enjoy equal systemic freedom. Presum-
ably, the following conditions must be met with regard to money: the state must
determine what counts as legal tender; it must ensure that legal tender is recog-
nized as having the same value by all participants in the public marketplace, and
it must assume sole control over the supply of legal tender. If it does not do these
things, then clearly it has not passed the test. A system of law that allows arbitrary
determinations of what counts as legal tender, that allows private persons to de-
termine whether legal tender is recognized and at what value it is given in the mar-
ket place, or that allows private persons to print as much money as they wish
clearly does not ensure that (the value of) one private person’s means (as money) is
protected from the arbitrary choices of other private persons. Since external free-
dom is to use one’s means to set and pursue ends subject to universal law, if these
systemic requirements are not met, one private person’s external freedom becomes
subjected to another private person’s arbitrary choice rather than to universal
law – and so is deprived of her innate right to freedom. If the state fails to regulate
the financial system and yet makes its people dependent on it, then, as with the
requirements concerning equal systemic freedom with regard to land and the
economy, the citizens cannot be seen as under political obligations to obey its
authority.
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
344 Helga Varden
2.3 Unconditional Poverty Relief
Most Kantians find Kant’s position deficient because of his alleged failure to
deal with issues not only of economic justice in general, but of the problem of pov-
erty in particular.36 Given this problem, contemporary Kantians, such as Onora
O’Neill and John Rawls, find it necessary to move away from Kant’s actual theory
in order to develop more egalitarian Kantian theories of justice.37 In contrast to
these interpretations, I propose that considerations of economic justice lie at the
very heart of Kant’s conception of justice, not only because of the requirements
ensuring equal systemic freedom outlined above, but because unconditional pov-
erty relief is identified as a minimal condition on the legitimacy of the state.38
Kant discusses the state’s duties towards the poor in section C of public right.39 As
in public right section B, which deals with conditions of equal systemic freedom,
Kant here is also concerned with how the public authority reconciles its monopoly
on coercion with each subject’s right to freedom by arguing that a systemic sol-
ution is necessary to rectify a systemic problem. Only by an institutional guaran-
tee of unconditional poverty relief can the state make rightful the dependency re-
lation between itself and those who have no means.
To reconcile its rightful monopoly on coercion with the rights of the poor, the
state must ensure that no private person finds herself without any means what-
soever with which to set and pursue ends, since external freedom is impossible
without means. Unconditional poverty relief, therefore, is necessary if the state is
to fulfil its role of providing conditions under which persons can exercise their in-
nate right to freedom. Without unconditional poverty relief the poor have no free-
dom, since they have nothing, and any access to means goes through some other
private person’s consent, such as to provide employment or charity. Without un-
conditional poverty relief, the possibility of poor persons exercising external free-
dom is subject to the arbitrary choices of those who have means. Consequently, as
the state upholds its monopoly on coercion, it must also ensure institutionally that
the poor do not find themselves so subject to the choices of others. Therefore,
Kant maintains that the state has a right and a duty to tax the rich in order to pro-
vide unconditional relief for the poor, even though he also says that no individual
private person has the corresponding right to coerce another to provide charity
(beneficence).
36 For example, see Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant, 184f.; Mary Gregor: Laws of Freedom,
36f; Wolfgang Kersting: “Kant’s Concept of the State”, 153, 164 n.7, though contrast
with his modified view on 356–357 in “Politics, freedom, and order: Kant’s Political Phi-
losophy”; Onora O’Neill: Bounds of Justice, 65; Allen Rosen: Kant’s Theory of Justice,
197; and Howard L. Williams: Kant’s Political Philosophy, 196–198.
37 For example, see Allen Rosen: Kant’s Theory of Justice, 173–208; Onora O’Neill: Con-
structions of Justice, 219–234; Towards Justice and Virtue, 122–212; John Rawls: A The-
ory of Justice, 221–227; Paul Guyer: Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 262–286.
38 My view that economic justice lies at the very heart of Kant’s conception of political legit-
imacy is in disagreement with almost all contemporary Kant interpretations. For example,
see Guyer (2000), Höffe (1994), Kersting (1992), Murphy (1994), and Williams (1983).
39 See MS, AA 06: 325–328.
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 345
The reason why many read Kant’s argument differently is due to claims like the
following: since the wealthy owe their existence to the state and since state has an
indirect right to preserve the people, the state will use taxation to provide for
the poor people’s “most necessary natural needs” [nothwendigsten Naturbedürf-
nissen]40. Given Kant’s formulation, we might be tempted to conclude that Kant is
just confused, since a claim that ‘natural needs’ can give rise to demands of justice
would undermine much of Kant’s account of justice. So even if Kant is here ex-
pressing a desire to incorporate into his theory of justice some notion of poverty
relief, he clearly fails to do so. In my view, however, the stronger interpretation of
Kant’s position on poverty relief pays careful attention to how this argument is
made within public right, and how public right is principally concerned with how
the sovereign must set up its institutional framework to reconcile its rightful mon-
opoly on coercion with the rights of each citizen. When Kant speaks of how the
wealthy owe their existence to the state, my suggestion is that he is referring to
the fact that the rightfulness of their property owners’ is provided by the state.41
Moreover, the state’s indirect right to preserve society refers to the fact that the
primary aim of the public authority is to maintain and preserve its people as a
rightful condition in perpetuity. And it does this by institutionally guaranteeing
each person’s innate right to freedom, namely by providing unconditional poverty
relief. The reason is that it must ensure that no one of its subjects ends up in a situ-
ation in which she has done nothing wrong and yet is in a private dependency re-
lation to other subjects, in that her external freedom is subject to their arbitrary
choices.42 It is true that the fact of our embodiment entails that we have natural
needs, which obviously makes even more pressing that without certain means we
cannot physically survive. But this is not Kant’s main point. Rather, the import-
ance of being embodied is that we exercise external freedom (in space and time).
Without poverty relief some people (the poor) find themselves in a situation where
they have no external freedom at all, and they can only access means if other
subjects (the rich) consent. But to be forced to stay in such a condition is to be
deprived of one’s innate right to freedom. Therefore, the sovereign must provide
unconditional poverty relief in order to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with
the innate right to freedom of each of its subjects.
The radical claim in Kant’s conception of poverty relief is that rightful external
freedom does not exist in societies in which some persons have no means and any
legal access to any means is dependent upon private charity or other private per-
sons’ decisions to provide employment. Here, the state is failing in its duty to es-
tablish conditions under which all persons are secured independence from having
their freedom subject to the arbitrary choices of other private persons. The state
cannot force its subjects into such dependency relations, and hence it cannot
rightfully uphold its monopoly on coercion unless it also provides an uncondi-
40 MS, AA 06: 326.09: “nothwenigste[.] Naturbedürfnisse[.]”.
41 See also V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 540.
42 Naturally, those who prefer other textual interpretations can still the above as the
stronger Kantian position.
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tional guarantee of poverty relief. Therefore, without an institutional guarantee
of unconditional poverty relief the state is not legitimate, and political obligations
do not exist. It is important to note that the claim is not that the state, in order
to be legitimate, must have an extensive welfare system. The claim is only that it
must take institutional steps whereby it guarantees the availability of means to
those who, for whatever reason, have none.
Finally, it should be clear that these arguments concerning the state’s role
as guarantor of equal systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief entail
that the state’s rights exceed the rights of individuals. More specifically, the state’s
right to ensure equal systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief are rights
that private individuals cannot have, for as private rights they are tantamount to
the right to enslave others. Moreover, that the state must provide these institu-
tional protections also explains why Kant’s position is not absolutist. By requiring
the state to provide systemic solutions to what he considers to be systemic prob-
lems, Kant argues that there are institutional requirements on the public authority
that cannot be set aside without undermining its legitimacy. The focus above has
been on only the very minimal conditions of equal systemic freedom that must be
fulfilled in order to justify the state’s legitimacy. Still, unless the state takes some
measures to fulfil these conditions, it is not legitimate, and political obligations do
not exist.
2.4 Pure and True Republics
Kant’s account above is an ideal normative account, meaning that it is an ex-
position of the public authority in theory. The next, final step in Kant’s argu-
ment concerns how to institutionalize the public authority, in particular the pub-
lic ‘thought entities’ (the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers) in the real
world. This requires us to explain how some actual person or persons rightfully
can hold sovereign authority. Answering this question comprises the final two
paragraphs (§ 51–52) of Kant’s public right section on the right of a state.43 Be-
cause it is tempting to read Kant as affirming absolutism in these paragraphs,
I want to suggest why we need not read him that way. There are at least two ways
to understand absolutism relevant to Kant’s discussion here. First it could mean
that the political leader can do whatever she wants and the people remain obli-
gated. But nowhere in this discussion (nor anywhere else) does Kant maintain that
particular institutionalizations of legitimate political power can involve setting
aside the principles of private and public right. So clearly Kant cannot be an ab-
solutist in this sense. Second, we could understand Kant’s alleged absolutism as
consisting in defending a non-representative conception of the sovereign. In the
rest of this section I argue that Kant also rejects the legitimacy of non-repre-
sentative sovereigns and that although he allows imperfections in states at early
43 See MS, AA 06: 338–342.
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stages of actual institutionalization of the sovereign, we should not see this as an
affirmation of absolutism.44
For Kant, there are three ways to conceive the relation between the people and
the sovereign: autocracy (one person having command over all the others), aris-
tocracy (a group of persons having command over the rest), and democracy (the
people commanding themselves).45 Moreover, the issue of the legitimacy of the
state is not seen as resting on the question of which form of state is institutional-
ized – autocracy, aristocracy, or democracy – but on the nature of the institu-
tionalization itself. Unless these sovereign powers are taken to represent the sov-
ereign, Kant argues, the particular state fails to be an establishment of civil
society, meaning that it fails to yield conclusive right. When the sovereign powers
do not represent the sovereign, Kant argues, “these forms of state are supposed
to represent literally just so many different moral persons invested with supreme
authority” and consequently “no absolutely rightful condition of civil society
can be acknowledged, but only provisional right within it”.46 Non-representative
states enable only provisional right, or right as we find it in the state of nature,
since the people with power consider themselves as the sovereign, rather than as
representing the sovereign. Thus, non-representative states fail to represent the
44 One can (textually and philosophically) accept the above arguments regarding equal sys-
temic justice and unconditional poverty relief and reject the argument concerning the rep-
resentational nature of the state, or reject both. Seemingly strong textual support for ab-
solutist interpretations in general and for rejecting the idea that the representational
nature of the sovereign is a condition upon its legitimacy in particular, can be found, for
example in “Toward Perpetual Peace” (ZeF, AA 08: 371–372), “On the Common Saying:
That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice” (TP, AA 08: 299–300), and in
the “Doctrine of Right” (MS, AA 06: 371–372). Due to space restrictions, I have not in-
cluded these passages, but let me briefly suggest why these passages need not be read as
contrary to my view. Their common feature is that Kant’s argument apparently leads him
to the absurd conclusion that a subject is obligated to obey any particular or empirical,
self-acclaimed public authority, regardless of how objectionable is its exercise of power.
Though Kant’s texts invite such an interpretation, I believe this conclusion is too hasty. In-
stead, I suggest that in each of these passages Kant argues that the content of the laws can
be quite faulty as long as the sovereign has the proper institutional form. Therefore, if
what is established is not at least public right in the minimal form (‘pure republic’), then
what is established is not a faulty version of the idea of public right – but no version of
public right at all. Therefore, when Kant uses the locutions such as ‘however faulty’ or
‘unconditional’ in these passages he should not be understood as referring to the funda-
mental principles constitutive of the constitution (the norm constitutive of the legislative
supreme authority), but to their actual specification (their content). Political obligations
do not disappear simply because the content of the laws is imperfect or is perceived to be
unfair so long as the normative principles constitutive of the fundamental institutional
structure are correct. Since the proper, minimal institutional structure necessary for politi-
cal freedom is in place, the only way to remove the unfairness without thereby creating in-
justice is to reform civil society through public reason from within.
45 See MS, AA 06: 338–339.
46 “[…] so lange jene Staatsformen dem Buchstaben nach eben so viel verschiedene mit der
obersten Gewalt bekleidete moralische Personen vorstellen sollen, [kann] nur ein pro-
visorisches inneres Recht und kein absolut-rechtlicher Zustand der bürgerlichen Gesell-
schaft zugestanden werden[…].” (MS, AA 06: 341.04–08)
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united, general will of the people. In these states the political power does not con-
ceive of itself as being governed by laws delineating its powers and all private dis-
putes ultimately to be adjudicated by an application of these laws. Instead those
in power are seen as ruling in accordance with their private judgement. Conse-
quently, such states do not, Kant argues, “make freedom the principle and indeed
the condition for any exercise of coercion47. And this is why these leaders fail to
set up civil society, since in this case, the actual persons with power rule in accord-
ance with their arbitrary choice rather than enable external freedom under uni-
versal law. Hence, the people still find themselves in the state of nature.
In order to establish ‘conclusive right’ the political authority must be institu-
tionalized as a ‘pure republic’ or as a representative system of right. In such a sys-
tem those in public offices are taken to represent the sovereign by governing the
public offices through public law. Such public organization captures the spirit
of what Kant means by ‘the original constitution for a free state’, since it requires
the institutional whole to be one “in which law itself rules and depends on no
particular person […]. It is the final end of all public right, the only condition in
which each can be assigned conclusively what is his”.48 If “law itself rules”, then
everyone invested with public power – whether the highest political sovereign
powers or the lower public officers such as police, public bureaucrats, and pub-
licly licensed professionals (physicians, accountants, lawyers) – has her job and
function prescribed in posited laws, and they exercise their authority in accord-
ance with those laws. For example, judges in the pure republic do not rule merely
by applying their intelligence or private wisdom, but rather are versed in the
law and continuously prove themselves capable of applying the law to particular
cases. If some particular judge is no longer able to apply the law or grossly fails
to do it in a particular case, her license is withdrawn by the state, and so on. This,
I take it, is what Kant means when he says that in the pure republic, the institu-
tional whole functions as a system of public law, namely “a system representing
the people”49.
In turn, Kant contrasts the ‘pure’ republic with the ‘true’ republic. The ‘true’ re-
public, for Kant, takes representation one step farther than the ‘pure’ republic
by requiring also the existence of active citizenship, understood as active partici-
pation in the political power through delegates. Kant argues that in the true re-
public there is not only a “system representing the people, in order to protect
its rights in its name”, but in addition “all the citizens united and acting through
their delegates (deputies)”.50 The true republic is one, in which the system repre-
47 MS, AA 06: 340: “[…] die Freiheit zum Princip, ja zur Bedingung alles Zwanges […]”; cf.
Anth, AA 07: 330–331.
48 “[…] die einzige bleibende Staatsverfassung, wo das Gesetz selbstherrschend ist, und an
keiner besonderen Person hängt; der letzte Zweck alles öffentlichen Rechts, der Zustand,
in welchem allein jedem das Seine peremtorisch zugetheilt werden kann” (MS, AA 06:
341.01–04).
49 MS, AA 06: 341: “[…] ein repräsentatives System des Volks”.
50 “Alle wahre Republik aber ist und kann nichts anders sein, als ein repräsentatives System
des Volks, um im Namen desselben, durch alle Staatsbürger vereinigt, vermittelst ihrer
Abgeordneten (Deputirten) ihre Rechte zu besorgen.” (MS, AA 06: 341.09–12)
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sents the people in the fullest sense, namely by the people ruling itself through its
elected representatives. In true republics, the citizens are not merely ‘passive’ sub-
jects to law; they are also active citizens who take part in the legislative process by
voting for delegates to represent them.51
It is certainly possible to read these final sections of the Doctrine of Right as en-
tailing that Kant defends absolutism. Nevertheless, in light of Kant’s preceding
argument that there are specific conditions on state legitimacy, we have good
reasons to see these final sections of the rights of the state as Kant’s understanding
of how to go about actually establishing the legitimate state in the real world. In
my view, nowhere in these last sections of the public right of a state (§ 51–52) does
Kant indicate that he aims to undermine his preceding arguments concerning the
nature of the institutional whole of public right, how the state must secure private
right for all its citizens, how it must have a tripartite nature, or how it must se-
cure equal systemic rights as well as unconditional poverty relief. Rather, the more
sympathetic reading considers him as merely addressing the question of various
possible actual institutionalizations of such a public authority. And I have sug-
gested that in order for the state to be legitimate, it must rest on a representative,
republican constitution (‘pure republic’), even if imperfect at first. Moreover, the
leaders of this republic must aim to transform it into a ‘true’ republic, in which
the people actively governs itself through delegates. Therefore, that political legit-
imacy requires a certain institutional framework is never at stake. And Kant’s con-
ception of political legitimacy is non-absolutist exactly because it requires a tri-
partite public authority to posit, apply and enforce laws to regulate private
property, contract and status relations for all and because the state must fulfill
these additional institutional, systemic conditions to be legitimate.
3. The Irreconcilability of Kant’s Public Right Account
and Weak Voluntarist Conceptions of Legitimate States
We can now see why, contrary to the claims of many neo-Kantian positions,
Kant’s position cannot be captured through the lenses of weak voluntarism. Ac-
cording to a weak voluntarist account, the rightful uses of state coercion are seen
as determined by those rights an individual can be seen as having transferred to
the state. On Kant’s position, however, public right is not identical to the provi-
sional rights of individuals in the state of nature (private right). The way in which
the state reconciles its monopoly on coercive authority with the rights of each
citizen entails that the rights of the state are not reducible to those of individuals.
For example, the state has the right to tax citizens in order to provide uncondi-
tional poverty relief while individuals do not have the right to enforce charity in
the state of nature. Although we cannot delineate a priori every way in which the
51 See MS, AA 06: 339. This reading seems supported by MS, AA 06: 328–329, where Kant
emphasizes that over time states must reform its laws such that all public positions must
be determined by merit rather than inheritance.
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rights of the state will exceed those of individuals, we can say that public right is
necessary to provide assurance and to make private right determinate and that
the state must set itself up with a civil institutional structure including additional
types of institutions in order to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with the rights
of each. Consequently, the rights of the state and the rights of individuals are not
identical, and weak voluntarism cannot be the perspective through which to read
Kant’s position.
In fact, attributing weak voluntarism to Kant serves only to mask the way in
which Kant’s actual theory inextricably ties issues of economic justice to the issue
of political legitimacy. I believe that because many contemporary Kantian theor-
ists interpret the Kantian position as weak voluntarist, they encounter deep prob-
lems in trying to capture issues of economic justice. These interpretations make
the mistake of assuming with the Lockeans that a Kantian solution must explain
the rights of the state as corresponding to those of the individual and hence that
the primary problem is how to make a liberal theory of freedom responsive to
considerations of (natural) need. For example, the early John Rawls and Onora
O’Neill are two prominent neo-Kantian philosophers who make this mistake.
They both seek a way to make determinate individual economic rights such that
the state can have a right to enforce them on an individual’s behalf. Consequently,
the puzzle they both see and try to solve is primarily concerned with how demands
of freedom (‘noumenal demands’) can be made responsive to demands of our
nature (‘phenomenal demands’). In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that
the state can enforce a framework according to which each citizen has a right to
be secured a list of basic goods, where this list of basic goods ties the choices
within the original position to the natural or empirical conditions of human life.52
In contrast, Onora O’Neill in several of her articles makes the individuals’ right to
charity enforceable by the state, since the state can enforce beneficence.53
A problem facing the early Rawls, as A. John Simmons points out, is that he
never explains why only the state (and not individuals) has the right coercively to
redistribute resources in accordance with the two principles of justice as fairness.
And yet if Rawls cannot explain this, then surely the door is open to challenge
Rawls’s weak voluntarism on strong voluntarist grounds.54 In O’Neill’s case the
problem is that Kant, for good reasons, explicitly denies that beneficence can be en-
forced. After all, if the reason you give money to pay your taxes (to be redistributed
to the poor by the state) is that you are afraid you are getting into trouble other-
wise, surely you are not performing an act of beneficence? Beneficence is an imper-
fect duty of virtue, which cannot be enforced.55 On the one hand, all virtue involves
internal use of choice (act on a particular maxim) and it requires a moral moti-
52 For example, see Rawls’s A Theory of Justice 226–227.
53 Onora O’Neill: Constructions of Justice, 219–234; Towards Justice and Virtue, 122–212;
Bounds of Justice, 97–142.
54 See A. John Simmons: “Justification and Legitimacy”. In: Justification and Legitimacy:
Essays on Rights and Obligations. New York 2001.
55 See MS, AA 06: 390.
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vation (that you act from duty), neither of which can be coerced.56 On the other
hand, beneficence is not only an ethical duty, but it is a duty of virtue, and con-
sequently involves making somebody else’s happiness your end because it is your
moral duty to do so.57 Hence, whatever the state does when it redistributes re-
sources from the wealthy to the poor, it cannot be coercively enforcing beneficence.
Finally, regardless of which voluntarist framework one chooses no solution faithful
to Kant’s basic commitments is possible, because any private redistribution and pri-
vate coercion used in an attempt to secure conditions of equal systemic freedom
and poverty relief will conflict with an individual’s innate right to freedom. Yet ex-
plaining these rights is necessary to finding a convincing Kantian solution to the
problem of how to protect the rights of the vulnerable and avoid systemic economic
injustice in civil society. In contrast, on my interpretation there is no conflict, since
through public right, namely a public institutional framework to secure equal
systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief, the state reconciles its rightful
monopoly on coercion with each subject’s innate right to freedom – and so is legit-
imate. Therefore, political legitimacy depends on securing conditions of economic
justice. A reading of Kant as a weak voluntarist cannot deliver this conceptual link.
4. Conclusion
Civil society is an enforceable precondition for justice. But this does not entail
that just any powerful coercive structure qualifies as civil society. The just state is
a representative, republican system of public right composed of a tripartite public
authority with a monopoly on uses of coercion, which is reconciled with each
subject’s innate right to freedom through securing private right for all, the provi-
sion of conditions of equal systemic freedom regarding land, the economy and
finances, and through the institutional guarantee of unconditional poverty relief.
Since these institutional conditions must be met before political obligations exist,
Kant’s liberal non-voluntarist ideal of political obligations is not matched by an
absolutist conception of political legitimacy. True, all changes regarding the con-
tent of particular laws and the particular ways in which the authority specifies
and enforces laws must be sought through legal appeals and through public
reason and reform. Still, if an actual state fails to establish the proper republican
public institutional framework, then it is not a civil society, and the people living
subject to its power are under an enforceable duty to establish civil society. Kant’s
conception of political legitimacy is therefore not a conception according to
which any systematic and powerful use of might is seen as yielding political ob-
ligations (absolutism), since there are institutional requirements on the political
authority. Because of this link between political obligations and the existence of
a public institutional framework, Kant’s liberal republican account of political
legitimacy also shows why absolutism is not the only alternative to voluntarism.
56 See MS, AA 06: 219ff., 453–454, 376n.
57 See MS, AA 06: 388–389, cf. 379–384, 393–397.
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
AUTHOR’S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 
